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Abstract
In the globalization era, cryptography becomes more popular and powerful; in
fact it is very important in many areas (i.e. mathematics, computer science,
networks, etc). This thesis provides an overview and comparison between the
RSA cryptosystem and elliptic curve cryptography, which both focus on send-
ing and receiving messages. The basic theories of the RSA cryptosystem and
elliptic curve cryptography are explored. The RSA cryptosystem and elliptic
curve cryptography theories are quite similar but elliptic curve cryptography
is more complicated. The idea of the RSA cryptosystem is based on three
popular theorems which are Euler’s Theorem, Fermat’s Little Theorem and
the Chinese Remainder Theorem. This discussion shows that the reliability
and strong security of the RSA cryptosystem depends on the degree of dif-
ficulty of integer factorization. Therefore, methods for integer factorization
are discussed. In addition I show how the security of elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy depends on the apparent difficulty of solving the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem (ECDLP).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cryptography is the area of mathematics that disguises the information or
data of communications. The purpose of cryptography is to secure the mes-
sage between two persons so another person or adversary cannot understand
the enciphered message. Only the recipient can decipher the message. For
instance, military, government and diplomatic communications are suitable
applications for cryptography.
The objective of this thesis is to compare the encryption and decryption
between the RSA cryptosystem and elliptic curve cryptography. I also describe
some examples of their applications.
The RSA cryptosystem is the best known and most commonly used cryp-
tosystem. It is often called the public key cryptosystem. Elliptic curve cryp-
tography is the other cryptosystem which is included in this thesis. It involves
solving the discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves over a finite field.
Chapter 1 outlines the literature review, history of cryptography and some
basic theorems and algorithms. Then a description of the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange method and the El-Gamal public key cryptosystem are provided.
In Chapter 2 I discuss the RSA cryptosystem. The chapter begins with
the Euler’s formula and integer factorization that are significant for RSA. The
2RSA algorithm and primality testing are introduced. Further, the theory of
discrete logarithm in a finite field (Fp) and some applications of RSA are also
provided.
Chapter 3 is about elliptic curves and the associated elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy method. Further, a description of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem is provided. I also present some applications of elliptic curve cryp-
tography in the real life.
Chapter 4 includes a comparison between the RSA cryptosystem and ellip-
tic curve cryptography, using Mathematica software. This also includes some
examples to show how the encryption and decryption works in each case.
In Chapter 5 some conclusions will be made.
1.1 Literature review
The following are the literature I consulted:
1. Books
(a) Title: An Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography.
Authors: Jeffrey H., Jill P., Joseph H.S.
Publication: Springer, 2008.
Chapters used: 1, 2, 3 and 5.
(b) Title: Elliptic curves (Number theory and Cryptography).
Author: Lawrence C.Washington.
Publication: Chapman & Hall / CRC, 2003.
Chapters used: 2, 4, 5 and 6.
(c) Title: A classical introduction to cryptography exercise book.
Authors: Thomas Baigne`res, Pascal Junad, Yi Lu and Serge Vau-
denay.
3Publication: Springer Science + Business Media Incorporation, 2006.
Chapters used: 1 and 9.
(d) Title: Cryptoclub: Using mathematics to make and break secret
codes, workbook.
Authors: Beissinger, Janet, Pless and Vera.
Publication: AK Peters Limited, 2006.
Units used: 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7.
(e) Title: Basics of contemporary cryptography for IT practitioners.
Authors: Ryabko, Boris, Fionov and Andrey.
Publication: World Scientific Publishing Company Incorporated,
2005.
Chapters used: 2, 3 and 6.
(f) Title: Elliptic curves, A computational approach.
Authors: Susan Schmit and Horst G. Zimmer.
Publication: Berlin, Germany, 2003.
Chapters used: 1 and 3.
(g) Title: Rational points on elliptic curves.
Author: Joseph H. Silverman.
Publication: Springer-Verlag, New York Incorporation, 1992.
Chapters used: 1, 2 and 4.
(h) Title: An introduction to cryptography.
Author: Richard A. Mollin.
Publication: Chapman & Hall, 2001.
Pages used: 1 - 251.
2. Lecture notes
(a) Title: INFO412 - Mathematical and Cryptography.
4Authors: Associate Professor Peter Nickolas & Professor Martin
Bunder.
Publication: School of Mathematics & Applied Statistics, Univer-
sity of Wollongong,Australia.
Sections used: 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.
(b) Title: RSA crptosystem.
Author: Xin Guo.
Publication: Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations
Research.
Section used: Introduction.
(c) Title: Lecture 22: Cryptology.
Author: R. Sedgewick.
Publication: Department of Computer Science, Princeton Univer-
sity.
Pages used: 1 - 7.
(d) Title: Lecture 14 - Elliptic curve cryptography.
Author: Avinash Kak.
Publication: Computer and Network Security, Purdue University.
Pages used: 1 - 48.
(e) Title: Online number theory lecture notes and teaching materials.
Author: Keith Matthews.
Publication: Brisbane, Australia. Topics used: 22, 23 and 43.
(f) Title: Chapter 6 - RSA cryptosystem.
Author: Jozef Gruska.
Publication: Faculty of Informatics, Masaryk University.
Pages used: 1 - 15.
(g) Title: Lecture 12 - Non-secret key cryptosystems (How Euclid, Fer-
5mat and Euler created E-Commerce).
Author: David Evans.
Publication: Department of Computer Science, University of Vir-
ginia.
Address: http://www.cs.virginia.edu/cs588/lectures/lecture12.ppt
Pages used: 1 - 34.
(h) Title: Security.
Authors: Kevin Wayne and Robert.
Publication: Department of Computer Science, Princeton Univer-
sity.
Address: http://www.cs.duke.edu/courses/spring04/cps001/notes/Security-
4up.pdf
(i) Title: The RSA public key cryptosystem.
Author: Kevin Jeffay.
Publication: Department of Computer Science, University of North
Carolina.
Pages used: 1 - 11.
(j) Title: Number theory lecture notes.
Author: Broughan, K.A.
Publication: Department of Mathematics, University of Waikato.
Chapters used: 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14.
3. Web sources
(a) Title: Overview of Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems.
Address: www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2013.
Publication: RSA Laboratories.
(b) Title: Elliptic curve cryptography, An introduction.
Author: Dr. F. Vercauteren.
6Publication: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
Address: www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/talk-95.pdf
Content used: Introduction.
(c) Title: Elliptic curve cryptography.
Publication: Wikipedia.
Address: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic curve cryptography
(d) Title: Securing the web with elliptic curve cryptography.
Publication: Sun Microsystems Incorporation.
Address: http://research.sun.com/projects/crypto/
Section used: Introduction.
(e) Title: Elliptic curve cryptography.
Author: Steven Galbraith.
Publication: Department of Mathematics, University of Auckland,
New Zealand.
Address: www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/∼sdg/ecc.html
Section used: Summary.
(f) Title: An introduction to the RSA cryptosystem.
Author: Marcus Griep.
Address: www.devhood.com/Tutorials/tutorial details.aspx?tutorial id =
544
4. Journals, papers and book chapter
(a) Title: Elliptic curve cryptography and smart card.
Author: Ahmed Khaled M. Al-Kayali.
Publication: SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room.
Pages used: 1 - 15.
(b) Title: The advantages of elliptic curve cryptography.
7Author: Kristin Lauter.
Publication: Microsoft Corporation.
Pages used: 62 - 67.
(c) Title: Elliptic curve cryptosystem and its application.
Authors: G.V.S Raju and Rehan Akbani.
Publication: Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on
Systems, Man & Cybernetics (IEEE-SMC), 2003.
Pages used: 1 - 4.
(d) Title: Efficient implementation of elliptic curve cryptography and
personal digital assistance (PDAs).
Authors: Amol Dabholkal and Kin Choong Yow.
Publication: Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Sections used: Abstract, introduction and elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy.
(e) Title: Overview of elliptic curve cryptography.
Authors: Kiyomichi Araki, Takakazu Satoh and Shinji Miura.
Publication: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
Sections used: Introduction, discrete logarithm problem and the
ElGamal system.
(f) Title: RSA cryptosystem.
Author: Weihu Hong.
Publication: Department of Mathematics, Clayton College & State
University.
Pages used: 1 - 6.
(g) Title: RSA cryptosystem.
Author: Silvia Robles.
Publication: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
8Pages used: 1 - 10.
(h) Title: Securing telecommunication based on speaker voice as the
public key.
Authors: Monther Rateb Enayah and Azman Samsudin.
Publication: IJCSNS International Journal of Computer Science
and Network Security, VOL. 7 No. 3.
Pages used: 1 - 9.
(i) Title: Introduction to elliptic curve cryptography.
Author: Elisabeth Oswald.
Publication: Institute of Applied Information Processing and Com-
munication, Austria.
Contents used: Abstract and section 1.
(j) Title: Introduction to cryptography.
Author: Johannes Buchman.
Publication: Springer 2004.
Chapter used: 7.
5. History
(a) Title: Public key cryptography (PKC) History.
Address: www.livinginternet.com/i/is crypt pkc inv.htm
(b) Title: Cryptography.
Publication: Cryptography portal.
Address: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography
(c) Title: History of cryptography.
Author: David Terr.
Address: www.davidterr.com/science-articles/cryptography.html
(d) Title: RSA.
9Publication: Wikipedia.
Address: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA
(e) Title: A brief history - The origins of public key cryptography and
ECC.
Address: www.certicom.com/index.php/a-brief-history
(f) Title: A brief history of cryptography.
Authors: Charles Edge, Wlliam Barker and Zack Smith.
Publication: Foundation of Mac OS X Security.
1.2 A brief history of cryptography
1.2.1 Introduction and terminology of cryptography
Both cryptography and cryptology are mathematics and computer science ar-
eas that focus on security of information, particularly encryption and verifica-
tion. Nowadays, cryptography makes frequent use of mathematics, especially
discrete mathematics (i.e. number theory, information theory, computational
complexity, statistics and combinatorics). Recently, cryptography has become
an important part of computer and network security. This is to protect the
communication between computers (i.e. to protect data in the computer and
to protect data when it is being transferred), [58, 63].
Cryptography is from the Greek language where ‘kryptos’ means “hidden”
and ‘graphein’ means “to write”. So, generally cryptography means “secret writing”.
Cryptology means “the study of secret writing” and cryptanalysis means “code breaking”.
Basically, cryptography is concerned with encryption which is the process of
converting plaintext (i.e. the original message) into ciphertext (i.e. the dis-
guised message). The reverse process of encryption is called decryption (i.e.
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transforming the ciphertext into plaintext), [63, 58].
1.2.2 Types of cryptosystems
1. Caesar’s cipher
Caesar’s cipher was invented by Julius Caesar around 100 B.C. - 44 B.C.,
and used during his military campaigns. This cipher is one of the earliest
and simplest substitutions. The message (or plaintext) is encrypted by
changing each letter into a fixed number and then replacing each number
with a new letter which is also in the alphabet. The problem with this
method is that Caesar’s ciphers are very easy to break. Caesar’s cipher
is an instance of a substitution cipher, where each letter is substituted
with a different letter from the alphabet. By using the frequency of
occurrence of letters in the languages (i.e. English or others), these
substitution ciphers are very easy to break, [59, 58].
2. Vignere cipher
The Vignere cipher was created by Giovan Batista Belaso in 1553. This
cipher uses a secret keyword to encrypt the plaintext (i.e. the original
message). First, each letter in the plaintext is converted into a number.
Then this numerical value for each letter of the plaintext is added to the
numerical value of each letter of a secret keyword to get the ciphertext.
The Vignere cipher is harder to break than a substitution cipher, [59].
3. One-Time Pad
The one-time pad was invented in 1917. It is a very secure cryptosystem.
This cryptosystem works like the Vignere cipher, but this cipher uses a
secret keyword which is as long as the original text. Unfortunately, this
one-time pad might only be used once as the name implies, [59].
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4. Enigma
The Enigma machine was used during World War II by the German
Army to encrypt messages. The Enigma machine was like a typewriter
and applied a 4-letter secret code that was set by a user. The encrypted
message was considered to be impossible to break. The Allies tried to
break and analyze the code and did so near the end of the war, [59, 58].
5. Symmetric-key cryptography
Symmetric-key cryptography is where both senders and receivers share
the same keys. So those keys are used for both encryption and decryp-
tion. They are used mainly with block ciphers and stream ciphers. The
block cipher is an alphabetic form of cipher in which a block of plaintext
data and a key is taken, then ciphertext of the same size is output. In
contrast, stream ciphers works by creating randomly a long stream of
key material, which is combined with plaintext. It works like a one-time
pad encryption technique. Unfortunately, the key for decryption is eas-
ily calculated from the key used for encryption. The reason for this is
the key is hard to hide during transport (or passing). Besides, the key
and the method of decryption must be sent to the correct receiver. The
following cryptosystem solves this problem, [59, 58, 63].
6. Public-key cryptography
Public-key cryptography is also known as asymmetric key cryptography
because it uses two different keys. The following are the types of public-
key cryptography:
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(a) Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem
This is the first public-key cryptosystem that was invented by Whit-
field Diffie and Martin Hellman, working in collaboration with Ralph
Merkle in 1976. This cryptosystem uses two different keys, but they
are related: a public key and a private key. Both keys are secretly
generated. Basically, the public key is used for encryption while
the private key is used for decryption. The Diffie-Hellman algo-
rithm is based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem.
Even though Diffie achieved the concept of an asymmetric cipher,
he did not really get the precise function that met his requirements.
This only solved the key distribution. However, he inspired other
mathematicians and scientists to discover another cipher, the RSA
cryptosystem which is discussed next, [58, 63, 59, 47, 62, 61].
(b) RSA cryptosystem
RSA cryptosystem was developed by Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir
and Leonard Adleman in 1978. It has become a standard public-
key cryptography used to encrypt private data, and it was the first
published public key system. The high level of security of RSA de-
pends on the difficulty of factoring large numbers which are prod-
ucts of large primes. Around the 1980s, scientists noticed that even
though this difficulty occurred, it still did not achieve sufficient
security. Therefore, they developed a strong method for security
which created a hypothesis about the weaknesses of an adversary.
This method is used with specific computational algorithms to meet
the requirements of security. In 1984 the ElGamal public-key en-
cryption appeared. It was based on the discrete logarithm problem
and competed with the RSA cryptosystem. A year later, elliptic
curve cryptography appeared which was also based on the discrete
13
logarithm problem, [47, 58, 62, 63, 61, 60].
(c) Elliptic curve cryptography
Elliptic curve cryptography was invented by Neal Koblitz and Vic-
tor S. Miller in 1985. This is an efficient algorithm because it is
based on the discrete logarithm problem, which is apparently harder
to solve than other algorithms, particularly algorithms for factoring,
[62, 63, 39].
1.3 Basic theorems
The following results are standard propositions in elementary number theory.
Theorem 1.1 (Euler’s Theorem).
Let φ(n) be Euler’s phi function (i.e. φ(n) = ♯{j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n, gcd(j, n) = 1}).
If gcd(a, n) = 1 then aφ(n) ≡ 1 (mod n).
Proof. Let k1, k2, . . . , kφ(n) be a complete set of residues prime to n. Since
gcd(a, n) = 1, then ak1, ak2, . . . , akφ(n) is also a complete set of residues prime
to n. Then,
k1k2 . . . kφ(n) ≡ ak1ak2 . . . akφ(n) (mod n)
≡ aφ(n)k1k2 . . . kφ(n) (mod n)
Since gcd(ki, n) = 1, we can cancel ki from each side which gives
1 ≡ aφ(n) (mod n).

Theorem 1.2 (Fermat’s Little Theorem).
If p is prime then ap ≡ a (mod p) and if p ∤ a then ap−1 ≡ 1 (mod p).
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Proof. p ∤ a implies that gcd(a, p) = 1. Also, φ(p) = p − 1 and so ap−1 ≡
1 (mod p). Multiplying by a proves the first result in the case p ∤ a. If p|a
then a ≡ 0 (mod p) and so both sides are 0 (mod p). 
Theorem 1.3 (Chinese Remainder Theorem).
Let m1, m2, . . . , mk be a collection of pairwise relatively prime integers. This
means that
gcd(mi, mj) = 1 for all i 6= j.
Let a1, a2, . . . , ak be arbitrary integers. Then the system of simultaneous con-
gruences
x ≡ a1 (mod m1), x ≡ a2 (mod m2), . . . , x ≡ ak (mod mk) (1.1)
has a solution x = c. Further, if x = c and x = c′ are both solutions, then
c ≡ c′ (mod m1m2 . . .mk). (1.2)
Proof. (See [1, Theorem 2.25, p83]) 
1.4 Basic algorithms
Theorem 1.4 (Division Algorithm), [52].
Given any strictly positive integer d and any integer a, then there exist unique
integers q and r such that
a = qd+ r and 0 ≤ r < d.
Proof. To prove this algorithm, we need to look at the existence and unique-
ness which are to be proved separately.
Lemma: If a − qd ≥ d for a certain value of q, then we can replace q by
q′ = q + 1 and still satisfy the condition a− q′d ≥ 0.
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Proof: If a− qd ≥ d and q′ = q+1, then a− q′d = a− (q+1)d = a− qd− d ≥
d− d = 0. QED (Lemma).
Proof for existence:
Consider the set of all numbers of the form a − qd, such that q is an integer
and a − qd ≥ 0. There do exist numbers in the set: for instance, if a is
positive, then a is in the set (i.e. choose q = 0), and if a is negative then
a − ad = −a(d − 1) = |a|(d − 1) is in the set (i.e. choose q = a) since by
assumption d is strictly positive and so d− 1 ≥ 0.
Since we have seen that the set of integers of the form a − qd such that
a − qd ≥ 0 is not empty, this set has a smallest number a − qd. Then by
assumption a − qd ≥ 0. We claim that for this particular q, a − qd < d. In
fact, if a − qd ≥ d, then by the lemma above we can replace q by q′ = q + 1
and still have a − q′d ≥ 0. But if q′ = q + 1 then a − q′d is smaller than
q − qd (because q′ < q and d > 0, so a − q′d < q − qd), so if a − q′d ≥ 0 this
would contradict the fact that we have already chosen the smallest possible
non-negative number of the form a−qd. This proves the claim that a−qd < d,
and that proves the existence part of the Division algorithm theorem.
Proof for uniqueness:
Note first that since r is uniquely determined by q (i.e. since it is required that
r = a− qd), what we need to show is that there exist a unique value of q such
that 0 ≤ a− qd < d. Now suppose that q and q′ are satisfy this condition, i.e.
0 ≤ a− qd < d and 0 ≤ a− q′d < d as well. Then by subtraction we see that
since a− q′d ≥ 0,
(q′ − q)d = (a− qd)− (a− q′d) ≤ a− qd < d,
and likewise
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(q′ − q)d = (a− qd)− (a− q′d) ≥ 0− (a− q′d) = −(a− q′d) > −d
since a − q′d < d. Together, these two inequalities says that (q′ − q)d is an
integer strictly between −d and d. Since d > 0, one can divide through by d
to get
−1 < q′ − q < 1.
Since q′−q is an integer, this implies that q′−q = 0, (i.e. q′ = q). This finishes
the proof that q is unique and as previously noted it follows automatically that
r must also be unique. 
Theorem 1.5 (The Euclidean Algorithm).
Let a and b be positive integers with a ≥ b. The following algorithm computes
the gcd(a, b) in a finite number of steps.
1. Let r0 = a and r1 = b.
2. Set i = 1.
3. Divide ri−1 by ri to get a quotient qi and reminder ri+1,
ri−1 = ri · qi + ri+1 with 0 ≥ ri+1 < ri.
4. If the remainder ri+1 = 0, then ri = gcd(a, b) and the algorithm termi-
nates.
5. Otherwise, ri+1 > 0, so set i = i+ 1 and go to Step 3. The division step
(Step 3) is executed at most
2 log2(b) + 1 times.
Proof. (See [1, Theorem 1.7, p13]). 
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It is easy to understand the algorithm of Theorem 1.5 if we use an example.
Example 1.1 Finding the gcd of 97 and 56 by the Euclidean Algorithm:
97 = 1(56) + 41
56 = 1(41) + 15
41 = 2(15) + 11
15 = 1(11) + 4
11 = 2(4) + 3
4 = 1(3) + 1
3 = 1(3) + 0
Thus, gcd(81, 57) = 1.
Theorem 1.6 (Extended Euclidean Algorithm).
Let a and b be positive integers. Then the equation
au+ bv = gcd(a, b)
always has a solution in integers u and v.
Instead of a complete proof we give an example of a special case which illus-
trates the main idea of a complete proof.
Proof. Given gcd(a, b) = au+ bv = z. Let c1 = a, c2 = b, u1 = 1, u2 = 0, v1 =
0, v2 = 1. Then,
c1 = c2q2 + c3
c2 = c3q3 + c4
c3 = c4q4 + c5
c4 = c5q5 + c6
c5 = c6q6 + 0.
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So, gcd(a, b) = c6 = z = au6 + bv6. The backward recurrence is
c6 = c4 − c5q5
= c4 − q5(c3 − c4q4) = c4 − c3q5 + c4q4q5
= c4(1 + q4q5)− c3q5
= (c2 − c3q3)(1 + q4q5)− c3q5
= c2 + c2q4q5 − c3q3 − c3q3q4q5 − c3q5
= c2(1 + q4q5) + c3(−q3 − q3q4q5 − q5)
= c2(1 + q4q5) + (c1 − c2q2)(−q3 − q3q4q5 − q5)
= c2(1 + q4q5)− c1q3 − c1q3q4q5 − c1q5 + c2q2q3 + c2q2q3q4q5 + c2q5
= c1(−q3 − q3q4q5 − q5) + c2(1 + q4q5 + q2q3 + q2q3q4q5 + q5)
= c1u5 + c2v5.
Thus, u5 = −q3 − q3q4q5 − q5 and v5 = 1 + q4q5 + q2q3 + q2q3q4q5 + q5. 
For the Extended Euclidean algorithm, it is easy to understand if we give
an example to show how it works.
Example 1.2 Take a = 987, b = 543. Apply the Euclidean Algorithm:
• Step 1: a1 = 987, b1 = 543.
987 = 543 · 1 + 444
• Step 2: a2 = 543, b2 = 444.
543 = 444 · 1 + 99
• Step 3: a3 = 444, b3 = 99.
444 = 99 · 4 + 48
• Step 4: a4 = 99, b4 = 48.
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99 = 48 · 2 + 3
• Step 5: a5 = 48, b5 = 3.
48 = 3 · 16 + 0
So,
gcd(987, 543) = 3.
Reversing the steps enables us to write the greatest common divisor as a mul-
tiple of 987 added to a multiple of 543:
3 = 99− 48 · 2
= 99− ((444− 99 · 4) · 2)
= 99− (2 · 444− 99 · 8)
= 99 · 9− 2 · 444
= 9 · (543− 444)− (2 · 444)
= 9 · 543− 7 · 444
= 9 · 543− 7(987− 543)
= 2 · 543− 7 · 987.
So,
gcd(987, 543) = 3 = (−7) · 987 + 2 · 543
and we can take u = −7 and v = 3.
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1.5 The Diffie-Hellman key exchange method.
Here I give the steps in the well-known Diffie-Hellman key exchange method.
1. Alice and Bob are agree to use the large prime p with nonzero integer g
modulo p. Then they make the values of p and g available as public
knowledge. If possible, g is chosen such that its order (i.e., the order g
of is the smallest natural number n such that gn ≡ 1 (mod p)) in F∗p
(the multiplicative group of the finite field of prime order p) is a large
prime.
2. Alice has to pick a secret integer known to her only, say a, (i.e. she
does not tell anyone the value of a). At the same time, Bob also picks
an integer b that he keeps secret. Then Alice and Bob use their secret
integers to compute A ≡ ga (mod p) and B ≡ gb (mod p) respectively.
3. Then Alice sends A to Bob and Bob sends B to Alice. Notice that a
third person, might be able to observe the values of A and B.
4. Lastly, Alice and Bob use their secret integers to calculate as follows:
Alice computes : A′ ≡ Ba (mod p) and
Bob computes : B′ ≡ Ab (mod p).
Note that A′ ≡ Ba ≡ (gb)a ≡ (ga)b ≡ Ab ≡ B′ (mod p), so
A′ ≡ B′ (mod p). This common value A′ and B′ is their exchange key.
Example 1.3 1. Alice and Bob agree to use the prime p = 937 and the
primitive root g = 610.
2. Alice chooses the secret key a = 345 and computes
A ≡ ga (mod p) ≡ 610345 (mod 937) ≡ 872 (mod 937).
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Similarly, Bob chooses the secret key b = 789 and computes
B ≡ gb (mod p) ≡ 610789 (mod 937) ≡ 223 (mod 937).
3. Alice sends Bob the number 872 and Bob sends Alice the number 223.
These transmission are done over an insecure channel, so both A = 872
and B = 223 is considered as a public knowledge. But the private keys
a = 345 and b = 789 are remain secret.
4. Suppose that an eavesdropper, say Eve, sees this entire exchange. So
she can reconstitute Alice’s and Bob’s shared secret if she can solve
either of the congruences:
A′ ≡ Ba (mod p) ≡ 223a (mod 937) ≡ 520 (mod 937) or
B′ ≡ Ab (mod p) ≡ 872b (mod 937) ≡ 520 (mod 937),
for a and b, since then she will know one of their secret exponents.
As far as is known, this is the only way for Eve to find the secret shared
value without Alice’s or Bob’s assistance.
1.6 The El-Gamal public key cryptosystem
The El-Gamal public key cryptosystem was invented by Taher ElGamal in
1985, [64]. This cryptosystem is based on the discrete logarithm problem
which is also connected to the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Even though
Diffie-Hellman gives a method of transporting a secret key, it does not attain
all the objectives of public key cryptosystems. The Diffie-Hellman method
only provides a solution for the key distribution problem while the El-Gamal
public key cryptosystem solves the entire problem. A summary of El-Gamal
public key cryptosystem is given below.
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Public Parameter Creation
A trusted party chooses and publishes a large prime p
and an element g(mod p)of large (prime) order.
Alice Bob
Key creation
Choose a private key 1 ≤ a ≤ p− 1,
compute A ≡ ga(mod p),
publish the public key A.
Encryption
Choose a plaintext number m,
encode as a number mˆ,
choose a random ephemeral key k,
use Alice’s public key A to compute
c1 ≡ gk(mod p) and
c2 ≡ mˆAk(mod p),
Send the ciphertext (c1, c2) to Alice.
Decryption
Compute (ca1)
−1 ∗ c2(mod p),
This quantity is equal to mˆ.
Table 1.1: El-Gamal key creation, encryption and decryption, [1, Table 2.3,
p70].
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The following is an example using the El-Gamal public key cryptosystem.
Example 1.4 Bob chooses a prime p = 107 and primitive element g = 2.
Alice chooses a = 99 to be her private key. Then she computes and publishes
her public key A:
A ≡ ga (mod p) ≡ 299 (mod 107) ≡ 51 (mod 107).
Bob decides to send Alice the message encoded by m = 55. He chooses an
ephemeral key k = 197 and computes two quantities
c1 ≡ 2197 ≡ 70 (mod 107) and
c2 ≡ 55 · 51197 ≡ 81 (mod 107).
The pair (c1, c2) = (70, 81) is the ciphertext that Bob sends to Alice. Alice,
using her private key a = 99, first computes
(c1)
a ≡ 7099 ≡ 54 (mod 107) and then
((c1)
a)−1 ≡ 2 (mod 107).
Finally, Alice computes
((c1)
a)−1 · c2 (mod p) ≡ 2 · 81 ≡ 55 (mod 107),
and recovers the plaintext message m = 55.
Chapter 2
The RSA cryptosystem
Introduction: The RSA algorithm was developed by three reseachers,
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1978, [60]. It is one of the most world famous
public-key cryptosystems. Its purpose is to secure communication via
networks by using public keys to encrypt and decrypt messages, where a
private key is kept secret.
In this chapter I describe the theories that are related to the RSA
cryptosystem. These are integer factorization, the RSA algorithm, primality
testing and solving the discrete logarithm problem in finite field. Also, I give
some applications of the RSA cryptosystem in the real world. Basically the
RSA cryptosystem is based on modular exponentiation. The modulus N is
the product of two large primes N = pq. I start with Euler’s formula which is
the fundamental formula for RSA cryptosystems.
2.1 Euler’s formula and roots modulo pq
Theorem 2.1 (Euler’s Formula for pq). [1, Theorem 3.1, p114]
Let p and q be distinct odd primes and let g = gcd(p− 1, q − 1). Then,
a(p−1)(q−1)/g ≡ 1(mod pq), for all a satisfying gcd(a, pq) = 1.
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Proof. By assumption, we know that p does not divide a and that g divides
q − 1, so we can compute
a(p−1)(q−1)/g = (a(p−1))(q−1)/g, ((q − 1)/g, is an integer)
≡ 1(q−1)/g (mod p), (ap−1 ≡ 1 (mod p), from Fermat Little Theorem)
≡ 1(mod p).
The exact same computation, reversing the roles p and q, shows that
a(p−1)(q−1)/g ≡ 1 (mod q). This proves that a(p−1)(q−1)/g − 1 is divisible by
both p and q. Hence, it is divisible by pq. 
The difficulty of finding eth roots modulo N (i.e. solving equations of the
form xe ≡ c (mod N)) makes the RSA cryptosystem very secure. The next
proposition is to take eth roots modulo N, where the modulus N is prime.
Proposition 2.2 [1, Proposition 3.2, p115]
Let p be a prime and let e ≥ 1 be an integer satisfying gcd(e, p− 1) = 1.
Then e has an inverse d modulo p− 1, de ≡ 1 (mod p− 1), and the
congruence xe ≡ c (mod p) has the unique modulo p solution x ≡ cd (mod p).
Proof. Let c ≡ 0 (mod p). Then we set x = 0 and we are done. Let
c 6≡ 0 (mod p). Then, there exist an integer d such that de ≡ 1 (mod p− 1)
i.e. de = 1 + k(p− 1) where k is a positive integer.
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We need to check that xe ≡ c (mod p):
xe ≡ (cd)e
≡ cde (mod p)
≡ c1+k(p−1) (mod p), (since de = 1 + k(p− 1))
≡ c1 · ck(p−1) (mod p)
≡ c · (cp−1)k (mod p)
≡ c · 1k (mod p), (by Fermat’s Little Theorem)
≡ c (mod p).
This shows that cd is the solution for xe ≡ c (mod p), (i.e. x = cd).
We need to show the solution is unique. Let x1 and x2 are the solutions to
xe ≡ c (mod p). Then
x1 ≡ xde1 ≡ (xe1)d ≡ cd ≡ (xe2)d ≡ xde2 ≡ x2 (mod p).
Thus, x1 ≡ x2 (mod p) and xe ≡ c (mod p) has an unique solution modulo p.

Example 2.1 Let p = 127, q = 131, n = 127 ∗ 131 = 16637 and d = 157.
Then, ϕ(16637) = 126 ∗ 130 = 16380. The Extended Euclidean algorithm
(Theorem 1.6) is a procedure to find α, β, and c where α ∗ a+ β ∗ b = c, for
integers a, b, and c such that gcd(a, b) = c. If we compute e using the
Extended Euclidean algorithm we can set a = ϕ(n), b = d and we know that,
since ϕ(n) and d are relatively prime, at the end of the algorithm we will
obtain c = 1. However, we will also obtain α and β where
α ∗ ϕ(n) + β ∗ d = 1, and β will be the multiplicative inverse of d (mod ϕ(n)).
Using this procedure we arrive at e = 157−1 (mod 126) = 61. Suppose we
have a message
m = MY BEST FRIEND.
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Then, we can set each letter in the alphabet equal to a two-digit number. This
will ensure that there is no ambiguity when encoding and decoding. If
A = 1, B = 2, . . . , then 12 could mean AB or L. Therefore we set
blank = 00, A = 01, B = 02, . . . , Z = 26. The encoded message becomes
m = 1325 0002 0519 2000 0618 0905 1404.
Note that the message has is broken into 7 blocks of two letters each. If we
put it in blocks of three letters, they would not necessarily each be less than
n− 1 = 16636. Let m1 be the first block of the message. Then to encipher m1
we calculate
E(m1) ≡ (m1)e ≡ (1325)61 ≡ 3164 (mod 16637).
E(m2) ≡ (m2)e ≡ (2)61 ≡ 6509 (mod 16637).
E(m3) ≡ (m3)e ≡ (519)61 ≡ 6371 (mod 16637).
E(m4) ≡ (m4)e ≡ (2000)61 ≡ 1762 (mod 16637).
E(m5) ≡ (m5)e ≡ (618)61 ≡ 9046 (mod 16637).
E(m6) ≡ (m6)e ≡ (905)61 ≡ 5271 (mod 16637).
E(m7) ≡ (m7)e ≡ (1404)61 ≡ 9963 (mod 16637).
Let c denote the ciphertext for the entire message, then
c = 3164 6509 6371 1762 9046 5271 9963.
It is easy to check that the deciphering method works. For example for m1,
3164157 ≡ 1325 (mod 16637).
The next proposition is quite similar to Proposition 2.2, but this proposition
describes what to do if N = pq, where p and q are primes.
Proposition 2.3 (Modulo pq) [1, Proposition 3.4, p116] Let p and q be
distinct primes and let e ≥ 1 satisfy gcd(e, (p− 1)(q − 1)) = 1, so e has an
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inverse modulo (p− 1)(q − 1), say de ≡ 1 (mod(p− 1)(q − 1)). Then, the
congruence, xe ≡ c (mod pq) has the unique solution x ≡ cd (mod pq).
Proof. We assume that gcd(c, pq) = 1. The congruence
de ≡ 1 (mod (p− 1)(q − 1)) means that there is an integer k such that
de ≡ 1 + k(p− 1)(q − 1). Now, we check that cd is a solution to
xe ≡ c (mod pq):
(cd)e ≡ cde (mod pq)
≡ c1+k(p−1)(q−1) (mod pq)
≡ c(c(p−1)(q−1))k (mod pq)
≡ c · 1k (mod pq)
≡ c (mod pq).
This completes the proof that x ≡ cd is a solution to the congruence
xe ≡ c (mod pq). I need to show that the solution is unique. Suppose that
x = u is a solution to the congruence, then
u ≡ ude−k(p−1)(q−1) (mod pq), since de = 1 + k(p− 1)(q − 1)
≡ (ue)d · (u(p−1)(q−1))−k (mod pq)
≡ (ue)d · 1−k (mod pq)
≡ cd (mod pq).
Thus, every solution to the congruence is equal to cd (mod pq), so this is the
unique solution. 
Example 2.2 We solve the congruence,
x18761 ≡ 32198 (mod 27221)
where the modulus N = 27221 = 163 · 167 is the product of the two primes
p = 163 and q = 167. The first step is to solve the congruence
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18761 · d ≡ 1 (mod 26892)
where 26892 = (p− 1)(q − 1) = 162 · 166. The solution for d is
d ≡ 10901 (mod 26892). Then, x ≡ 3219810901 ≡ 13619 (mod 27221) is the
solution to x18761 ≡ 32198 (mod 27221) or we have
g = gcd(p− 1, q − 1) = gcd(162, 166) = 2,
so (p− 1)(q − 1)/g = (162)(166)/2 = 13446, means we can find a value of d.
Solving the congruence, 18761 · d ≡ 1 (mod 13446). The solution is
d ≡ 10901 (mod 13446),
then x ≡ 3219810901 ≡ 13619 (mod 27221) is the solution to
x18761 ≡ 32198 (mod 27221).
2.2 Integer Factorization
Introduction: The security of the RSA cryptosystem and elliptic curve
cryptography depends on large prime numbers (i.e. the factors of the
modulus N). To break a system, we simply need to factor N = pq to discover
p and q. This section describes four methods for factorization. If N is very
large, this problem is difficult, especially if p and q are themselves also large.
Here four of the early methods used to factor integers are given. There is no
attempt here to be comprehensive. We describe the difference of two squares
factorization, the trial division method, the Pollard’s p− 1 factorization
method and conclude with Lenstra’s elliptic curve factorization method.
2.2.1 Difference of two squares factorization.
This factorization is sometimes known as a quadratic sieve. We start with
the simple factorization,
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X2 − Y 2 = (X + Y )(X − Y ).
Suppose we need to factor a number N , where N + b2, for some integer b, is a
perfect square, say a2. Then, N + b2 = a2, so
N = a2 − b2 = (a+ b)(a− b),
and we have a factorization of N .
Example 2.3 We factor N = 34571 by looking for an integer b making
N + b2 a perfect square:
34571 + 12 = 34572, Not a square,
34571 + 22 = 34575, Not a square,
34571 + 32 = 34580, Not a square,
34571 + 42 = 34587, Not a square,
34571 + 52 = 34596 = 1862, A square.
Then we compute
34571 = 1862 − 52 = (186 + 5)(186− 5) = 191 · 181.
The numbers 191 and 181 are primes, so the factorization of N is
34571 = 191 · 181.
2.2.2 Trial Division.
The trial division method seeks to find a factor of N by checking all possible
prime factors of N . Trial division algorithm checks for all prime numbers p
that are less than or equal to
√
N , whether they divide N . If the algorithm
fails (i.e. none of the prime numbers p divides N), then it shows that N is
prime. Trial division is an inefficient algorithm for large numbers N with
large prime factors. In factorization, trial division is usually applied to find
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any small prime factors. This leads us to the following definition and
theorem.
Definition 2.1 Given a composite integer N (i.e. N can be factored), then
trial division consists of trial-dividing N by every prime number less than or
equal to
√
N .
Theorem 2.4 [57, Theorem 7.1.1, p152] If N is a composite positive
integer, then N has a prime divisor p which is less than or equal to
√
N .
Proof. Since N is composite, we can write N = ab with a > 1 and b > 1.
Now we have a ≤ √N or b ≤ √N , since otherwise
N = ab >
√
N
√
N = N .
Suppose that a ≤ √N . Then, a has a prime divisor p which also divides N .
Thus, p ≤ a ≤ √N . 
Example 2.4 We use trial division to factor 584. The first prime divisor
that we find is 2 and 584
2
= 292. The next prime factor is again 2 and
292
2
= 146. Similarly, the next factor is also 2 and 146
2
= 73. The number 73
is prime. Hence, the prime factorization of 584 is
584 = 23 · 73.
Trial division also can be used to decide whether a number N is prime. This
leads us to the following example.
Example 2.5 Let N = 120643 is prime. We have
⌊√N⌋ = ⌊√120643⌋ = 347.
Hence, we must test whether one of the prime numbers p ≤ 347 divides N .
The primes p ≤ 347 are
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2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97,
101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, 181,
191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223, 227, 229, 233, 239, 241, 251, 257, 263, 269, 271,
277, 281, 283, 293, 307, 311, 313, 317, 331, 337, 347.
The primes which divide N are 223 and 541. Therefore, N is a not prime.
Example 2.6 We use trial division to factor N = 1549. So we have
⌊√N⌋ = ⌊√1549⌋ = 39.
So, we must test whether one of the prime numbers p ≤ 39 divides N . The
primes p ≤ 39 are 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37.
By observation, none of the 12 primes divides N evenly. Thus, N is a prime
number.
2.2.3 Pollard’s p− 1 factorization algorithm.
Pollard’s p− 1 algorithm was invented by John Pollard in 1974, [65]. This
algorithm finds, a factor of N ∈ N. Following are the steps of the algorithm.
1. Given a number N = pq and we need to find the prime factors p and q.
Suppose that we search for an integer L such that
p− 1|L and q − 1 6 |L.
This means that there are integers i, j and k with k 6= 0 satisfying
L = i(p− 1) and L = j(q − 1) + k.
2. Choose an integer a (i.e. by assuming p 6 |a and q 6 |a) and compute aL.
Fermat’s Little Theorem (Theorem 1.2) tells that
aL = ai(p−1) = a(p−1)i ≡ 1i ≡ 1 (mod p),
aL = aj(q−1)+k = ak · a(q−1)j ≡ ak · 1j ≡ ak (mod q).
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3. The exponent k 6= 0, so ak 6≡ 1 (mod q).
4. So for the given value of a, we find that
p|aL − 1 and q 6 |aL − 1.
This implies that p = gcd(aL − 1, N).
5. If p− 1 is a product of small primes, then p− 1|n! for some n (i.e. Let
n = 2, 3, . . . , then compute p = gcd(an! − 1, N)).
6. If gcd(an! − 1, N) = 1, then go on to the next value of n. Otherwise, we
have a nontrivial factor of N . But if p = N , then this algorithm is fails.
Example 2.7 We use Pollard’s p− 1 algorithm to factor N = 220459.
gcd(22! − 1, 220459) = 1
gcd(23! − 1, 220459) = 1
gcd(24! − 1, 220459) = 1
gcd(25! − 1, 220459) = 1
gcd(26! − 1, 220459) = 1
gcd(27! − 1, 220459) = 1
gcd(28! − 1, 220459) = 449
The final line gives us a nontrivial factor p = 449 of N . This factor is prime,
and the other factor q = N
p
= 220459
449
= 491 is also prime. The reason that an
exponent of 8! worked in this instance is that p− 1 factors into a product of
small primes,
p− 1 = 448 = 26 · 7|8! = 90.
The other factor satisfies
q − 1 = 490 = 2 · 5 · 72 6 |8! = 576
7
,
which also a product of a small primes.
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2.2.4 Lenstra’s factorization algorithm using elliptic
curves.
Lenstra’s elliptic curve method was invented by Hendrik Lenstra to solve the
problems of factoring integers into a product of two primes, [75].
Pollard’s method presented in the previous section is based on the non-zero
elements of Z/pZ form a multiplicative group (Z/pZ)∗ of order p− 1.
However, Lenstra’s method replaces the multiplicative group (Z/pZ)∗ = F∗p
by the group of points on an elliptic curve E(Fp), and an integer a by a point
P ∈ E(Fp). By choosing an integer k as a product of small primes, so the
number of elements of E(Fp)|k, which implies kP = O ∈ E(Fp). Using this
idea we can get a non-trivial factor of N .
Pollard’s method fails if N = pq then both p− 1 and q − 1 have large prime
factors. However Lenstra’s method is flexible. If it fails using a particular
elliptic curve, we can choose a new curve and start over again.
Note that these are unclear explanations but consider it as an algorithm.
Note that
#E(Fp) = p− 1− εp with |εp| ≤ 2√p, [72, p133].
As the curve E varies over all such curves, the numbers εp are reasonably
uniformly distributed over an interval of length 4
√
p. Thus, we can find a
curve E with the number of elements of E(Fp) equal to a product of small
primes.
There is some basic information about elliptic curve and the group structure
in Chapter 3.
Lenstra’s elliptic curve factorization algorithm: [72, 56]
Choose a composite integer N ≥ 2.
1. Check gcd(N, 6) = 1 so that N 6= mr for any r ≥ 2.
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2. Choose any integers A, x1 and y1 such that 1 < A, x1, y1 < N .
3. Let E be an elliptic curve, E : y2 = x3 + Ax+B.
Let B = y21 − x21 −Ax1 and point P = (x1, y1) ∈ E.
4. Check that a = gcd(4A3 + 27B2, N) = 1.
If a = N , then return to step 2 and choose a new integer A.
If 1 < a < N , then a is a non-trivial factor of N and we are done.
5. Choose an integer k such that
k = LCM{1, 2, 3, . . . , K} for some K ∈ N.
6. Compute
kP = (
ak
d2k
,
bk
d3k
)
= 1P + 2P + 22P + 23P + . . .+ 2rP, for some r ∈ N
= P0 + P1 + P2 + P3 + . . .+ Pr, for some r ∈ N
=
r∑
ki=1
Pi.
7. Calculate D = gcd(dk, N).
If 1 < D < N , then D is a non-trial factor of N and we are done.
If D = 1, then return to step 2 and choose a new integer A.
If D = N , then return to step 5 and decrease the value of k.
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Example 2.8 Let N = 1999843247, a point P = (2, 1) and elliptic curve
E : y2 = x3 + Ax+B. Note that gcd(N, 6) = 1. Let A = 6 implies
B = y2 − x3 − Ax = −19. So, E : y2 = x3 + 6x− 19 and a point
P = (2, 1) ∈ E.
Now, choose
k = LCM{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19}
= 232792560
= 24 + 25 + 26 + 27 + 28 + 213 + 221 + 222 + 223 + 224 + 226 + 227.
So,
r 2rP (mod 1999843247)
0 (2, 1)
1 (77, 1999842571)
2 (1010023132, 416202416)
3 (1821315272, 1927904597)
4 (672263808, 912268394)
5 (1937039248, 1450774960)
6 (995387252, 445795708)
7 (1963543744, 228429936)
8 (213910635, 1203300646)
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r 2rP (mod 1999843247)
9 (1925178367, 1096237088)
10 (1031420139, 455919973)
11 (1369870593, 830431437)
12 (1061855853, 264657833)
13 (758379778, 916045511)
14 (568842154, 1701729891)
15 (1343153277, 600645524)
16 (1053104612, 438503062)
17 (1060705278, 1183122481)
18 (434698066, 1218407806)
19 (614705915, 351047729)
20 (418567986, 241447683)
21 (1745194563, 793504621)
22 (777079984, 1688813810)
23 (1766760042, 1954188834)
24 (266756875, 696952738)
25 (1771573042, 1664186057)
26 (1658585264, 842158092)
27 (998323914, 274099838)
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I then compute kP = 232792560P ,
24P = 16P = (1053104612, 438503062)
(24 + 25)P = 48P = (689737312, 766476874)
(24 + 25 + 26)P = 112P = (326736690, 931029681)
(previous partial sum) + 27P = 240P = (392582429, 1939553715)
(previous partial sum) + 28P = 496P = (582646364, 295105563)
(previous partial sum) + 213P = 8688P = (1055413349, 1526098803)
(previous partial sum) + 221P = 2105840P = (1985478926, 1966774618)
(previous partial sum) + 222P = 6300144P = (1852388958, 510710323)
(previous partial sum) + 223P = 14688752P = (896131026, 1237386275)
(previous partial sum) + 224P = 31465968P = (1774327685, 1451569673)
(previous partial sum) + 226P = 98574832P = (1634636045, 1074342536)
(previous partial sum) + 227P = 232792560P = The addition law breaks here.
The addition law breaks when we want to find the inverse modulo N of the
difference of x-coordinates between 98574832P and 227P . We obtain the
gcd(1634636045− 998323914, N) = 569 6= 1 which gives us the factor of
N = 569 · 6514663.
2.2.5 State of the art of integer factorization
Several factorization algorithms have been discovered which factor an integer
N which is a product of two primes faster than the 4 methods given above.
On 9 May 2005, the factorization of RSA-200 (i.e. a 663 bit number of 200
decimal numbers) was announced by the German Federal Agency’s team.
This algorithm was designed using general number field sieve (i.e. for
factoring numbers which have between 100 and 200 digits) with efficiency
which is
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O(exp((64 n
9
)
1
3 (logn)
2
3 )).
On 4 November 2005, the same team announced the factorization of RSA-640
which is 640 bits long (i.e. 193 decimal digits). These factorizations need a
few months using ordinary computer time, [68]. In August 1999, the largest
semiprime (i.e numbers with two prime factors) factored was RSA-155 (155
bits) using general number field sieve algorithms on 300 workstations and
personal computers. This factorization required 7.4 months, [70].
For a quantum computer, Shor’s algorithm solves the problem in polynomial
time. It was discovered by Peter Shor in 1994. Shor’s algorithm requires only
O(n3) time and O(n) space on n-bit number inputs. The first 7-qubit
quantum computer ran Shor’s algorithm in 2001 and factored the number 15,
[69].
2.3 The RSA Algorithm
Suppose Alice wants to send a message to Bob over an insecure
communication line, but has a problem sending sensitive information.
The RSA algorithm is based on the following idea: [1, Section 3.2, p119]
1. Setup
• Let p and q be large primes, let N = pq and let e and c be integers.
2. Problem
• Solve the congruence xe ≡ c (mod N) for the unknown x.
3. Easy
• Bob, who knows the values of p and q can easily solve for x.
4. Hard
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• Eve, who does not know the values of p and q, cannot easily find x.
5. Dichotomy
• Solving xe ≡ c (mod N) is easy for a person who possesses certain
extra information, but it is apparently hard for all other people.
Example 2.9 We illustrate the RSA public key cryptosystem with a small
numerical example:
1. RSA Key Creation
• Bob chooses two secret primes p = 1597 and q = 1481.
Bob computes his public modulus, N = pq = 1597 · 1481 = 2365157.
• Bob chooses a public encryption exponent e = 25637 with the
property that gcd(e, (p− 1)(q − 1)) = gcd(25637, 2362080) = 1.
2. RSA Encryption
• Alice converts her plaintext into an integer m = 1987654 satisfying
1 ≤ m < N .
• Alice uses Bob’s public key (N, e) = (2365157, 25637) to compute
c ≡ me (mod N), c ≡ 198765425637 ≡ 1563057 (mod 2365157)
• Alice sends the ciphertext c = 1563057 to Bob.
3. RSA Decryption
• Bob knows (p− 1)(q − 1) = 1596 · 1480 = 2362080. So he can
solve, ed ≡ 1 (mod (p− 1)(q − 1)) implies
25637 · d = 1 (mod 2362080) for d and find that d = 984653.
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• Bob takes the ciphertext c = 1563057 and computes cd (mod N),
1563057984653 ≡ 1987654 (mod 2365157). The value that he
computes is Alice’s message m = 1987654.
We summarized the RSA cryptosystem in the table:
Bob Alice
Key creation
Choose secret primes p and q,
choose encryption exponent e
with gcd(e, (p− 1)(q − 1)) = 1.
Publish N = pq and e.
Encryption
Chooses plaintext m.
Use Bob’s public key (N ,e) to compute
c ≡ me (mod N).
Sends ciphertext c to Bob.
Decryption
Compute d satisfying
ed ≡ 1 (mod (p− 1)(q − 1)).
Compute m′ ≡ cd (mod N).
Then, m′ equals the plaintext m.
Table 2.1: RSA key creation, encryption and decryption, [1, Table 3.1, p119]
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2.4 Primality testing
The purpose of this section is to describe the primality tests, i.e. algorithms
which determine whether a number is prime or not with probability 1.
The situation is as follows: Bob uses his RSA public/private key pair to
communicate with Alice. So, Bob needs to choose primes p and q that are
very large to form a RSA key pair. If p and q are small primes, then the
eavesdropper, say Eve, can find the factors p and q and break Bob’s system.
Assume Bob knows how to distinguish prime and composite numbers. Then
he can choose large random numbers until he finds one that is prime.
Fermat’s Little theorem says if p is prime then ap−1 ≡ 1 (mod p). We state a
suitable version of Fermat’s Little theorem that puts no restriction on a.
Theorem 2.5 (Fermat’s Little Theorem, Version 2)
Let p be a prime number. Then
ap ≡ a (mod p),
for every integer a.
Proof. If p 6 |a, then the first version of Fermat’s Little Theorem (Theorem
1.2) implies that
ap−1 ≡ 1 (mod p).
Multiplying both sides by a proves that ap ≡ a (mod p) is true. On the other
hand, if p|a, then both sides of ap ≡ a (mod p) are 0 modulo p. 
The compositeness test given below shows that a number is composite with a
probability 1 or prime with probability 1. We need to check whether n is
composite. This leads us to make the following definition.
Definition 2.2 Fix an integer n. We say that an integer a is a witness for
(the compositeness of) n if an 6≡ a (mod n).
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The next proposition is used to formulate the so-called Miller-Rabin test
which is used to test whether a number is (probably) prime.
Proposition 2.6 [1, Proposition 3.16, p126]
Let p be an odd prime and write
p− 1 = 2kq, with q an odd integer.
Let a be any number not divisible by p. Then one of the following two
conditions is true:
(i) aq is congruent to 1 modulo p.
(ii) One of aq, a2q, a4q, . . . , a2
k−1q is congruent to −1 modulo p.
Proof. Fermat’s Little Theorem (Theorem 1.2) tells us that
ap−1 ≡ 1 (mod p). This means that when we look at the list of numbers
aq, a2q, a4q, . . . , a2
k−1q, a2
kq,
we know that the last number in the list, which equals ap−1, is congruent to 1
modulo p. Further, each number in the list is the square of the previous
number. Therefore one of the following two possibilities must occur:
(i) The first number in the list is congruent to 1 modulo p.
(ii) Some number in the list is not congruent to 1 modulo p, but when it
squared, it becomes congruent to 1 modulo p. But the only number
satisfying both
b 6≡ 1 (mod p) and b2 ≡ 1 (mod p)
is −1, so one of the numbers in the list is congruent to −1 modulo p. 
If the number n is definitely composite number then it can be said that a is a
Miller-Rabin witness for n. This is given more precisely by the following
definition.
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Definition 2.3 Let n be an odd number and write n− 1 = 2kq with q an odd
integer. An integer a satisfying gcd(a, n) = 1 is called a Miller-Rabin witness
for (the compositeness of) n if both of the following conditions are true:
(a) aq 6≡ 1 (mod n).
(b) a2
iq 6≡ −1 (mod n) for all i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , k − 1.
Note: A Carmichael number is a composite positive integer n which satisfies
the congruence bn−1 ≡ 1 (mod n) for all integers b which are relatively prime
to n.
Example 2.10 We illustrate the Miller-Rabin test with a = 4 and the
number n = 561, which you may recall, is Carmichael number. We factor
n− 1 = 560 = 24 · 35
and compute
435 ≡ 166 (mod 561),
42·35 ≡ 1662 ≡ 67 (mod 561),
44·35 ≡ 672 ≡ 1 (mod 561).
The first number 435 (mod 561) is neither 1 nor −1, and the other numbers
in the list are not congruent to −1, so 4 is the Miller-Rabin witness to the
fact that 561 is composite.
2.5 The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in
a finite field (Fp)
Introduction: The discrete logarithm problem can be solved using ideas
from the “index calculus”. We use an example to understand easily how the
DLP works.
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Example 2.11 Let p be the prime p = 18757 and use the index calculus to
solve the discrete logarithm problem
2x ≡ 211 (mod 18757).
We note that g = 2 is a primitive root modulo p = 18757. We take B = 5, so
our so-called factor base is the set of primes {2, 3, 5}. We start by taking
random powers of g = 2 modulo 18757 and pick out the values that are
B-smooth, (i.e. gn = 2e13e25e3 (mod p), ei ≥ 0). After several hundred
attempts we obtain four equations/congruences:
g6819 ≡ 22 · 32 · 5 (mod 18757), g8612 ≡ 23 · 33 · 5 (mod 18757),
g10053 ≡ 23 · 32 · 52 (mod 18757), g12934 ≡ 22 · 54 (mod 18757).
These in turn give linear relations for the discrete logarithms of 2, 3 and 5 to
base g. For example, the first one says that
6819 ≡ 2 · logg(2) + 2 · logg(3) + logg(5) (mod p− 1),
where logg(a)is the discrete logarithm value.To ease notation, we let
x2 = logg(2), x3 = logg(3), x5 = logg(5).
Then, the four congruences become the following four linear relations:
6819 = 2x2 + 2x3 + x5 (mod 18756)
8612 = 3x2 + 3x3 + x5 (mod 18756)
10053 = 3x2 + 2x3 + 2x5 (mod 18756)
12934 = 2x2 + 4x5 (mod 18756)
Note that the formulas above are congruences modulo
p− 1 = 18756 = 36 · 521,
since discrete logarithms are defined only modulo p− 1. The number 521 is
prime, so we need to solve the system of linear equations modulo 36 and
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modulo 521. This is easily accomplished by Gaussian elimination, (i.e. by
adding multiples of one equation to another to eliminate variables). The
solutions are
(x2, x3, x5) ≡ (1, 28, 29) (mod 36),
(x2, x3, x5) ≡ (1, 229, 107) (mod 521).
Combining these solutions yields
(x2, x3, x5) ≡ (1, 1792, 3233) (mod 18756).
We check the solutions by computing
21 ≡ 2 (mod 18757), 21792 ≡ 3 (mod 18757), 23233 ≡ 5 (mod 18757).
Recall that our ultimate goal is to solve the discrete logarithm problem
2x ≡ 223 (mod 18757).
We compute the value of 223 · 2−k (mod 18757) for random values of k until
we find that is B-smooth. After a few attempts we find that
223 · 2−12380 ≡ 24 · 33 · 52 (mod 18757).
Using the values of the discrete logs of 2,3 and 5 from above, this yields
logg(223) = 12380 + 4logg(2) + 3logg(3) + 2logg(5)
= 12380 + 4 · 1 + 3 · 1792 + 2 · 3233
≡ 5470 (mod 18756).
Finally, we check our answer logg(223) = 5470 by computing
25470 ≡ 223 (mod 18757).
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2.6 Applications of the RSA cryptosystems
1. Smart card
• The use of RSA keys on smart cards is a significant development
because smart cards are time constrained and algorithms can
generate the keys quickly.
• The cost of generating the keys is low. Since the private keys are
kept secret by the end user, the cards are more secure and have
more memory, [74].
2. Mobile phone conversation
• Mobile devices are very important in the modern world. So the
RSA cryptosystem, Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange and RC4
(“Rivest Cipher 4” designed by Ron Rivest, 1987) have been used
to generate a public cryptographic key from a user’s voice so that
a speaker’s voice can be identified. This generated key is used to
encrypt and decrypt the information sent via an open
communication channel.
• The encryption/decryption prevents eavesdroppers listening or
interrupting voice calls. Furthermore, it eliminates the need for a
trusted third party in a communication (e.g. a telephone
company).
• Generated keys are divided into public keys and private keys. The
public key is generated from the speaker’s voice and the
corresponding private key will be considered as the DH private
key. A shared secret will be calculated to generate the input key
for the RC4. The RC4 algorithm will generate a key-stream to
complete the encryption and decryption process, [32].
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3. Automatic Teller Machines (ATM)
• An ATM card is one kind of smart card. Conventionally, when a
customer attempts to withdraw money from a bank, the bank
officer will ask for account holder identification (e.g. a driving
license) in order to verify an individual’s identity. The ATM
machines, however, use cryptography for identification, [76, 50].
• Every ATM card is holds a “secret” Personal Identification
Number (PIN), which gives the card holders more secure access to
their account. As soon as an ATM card is inserted into the ATM
machine, the cardholder is immediately asked for the PIN. If the
correct PIN is entered, the machine identifies that person as the
rightful owner and grants access, [76].
Chapter 3
Elliptic curve cryptography
Introduction: This chapter will describe the basic theory of elliptic curves,
the way elliptic curves work in cryptography (i.e. for encryption and
decryption) and the applications of elliptic curves to cryptography in the real
world, [1, Chapter 5, p279].
3.1 Elliptic curves
Introduction: The equation of an elliptic curve can be written in the form
Y 2 = X3 + AX +B
where A and B are integers with discriminant ∆ = 16(4A3 − 27B2) 6= 0. This
condition ensures the curve does not have a cusp or double point on the real
axis. This is also called a Weierstrass equation. It is a special type of elliptic
curve but is all that we need here. Two examples of elliptic curves are
Y 2 = X3 − 3X + 3,
Y 2 = X3 − 6X + 5.
In the figures 3.1 and 3.2, I give plots of the points in (x, y) ∈ R2 which
satisfy these equations. Note that for the first equation the cubic
X3 − 3X + 3 has 1 real root and the second has 3 real roots.
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Figure 3.1: E : Y 2 = X3 + 3X − 3 and ∆ = 16(4(33)− 27(−32)) > 0.
In[192]:= E2 = ContourPlot@y^2 - x^3 + 6*x - 5, 8x, -10, 10<,
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Figure 3.2: E : Y 2 = X3 − 6X + 5 and ∆ = 16(4(−63)− 27(52)) < 0.
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The very important property of elliptic curves is that we are able to define an
operation + of addition for points which are on the curve, to produce a third
point which is also on the curve. This operation makes the curve, and various
subsets of points on the curve, into a finitely generated abelian group.
Example 3.1 Here the operation + is illustrated.
Let E be the elliptic curve, Y 2 = X3 − 7X + 10. The points P = (−3,−2)
and Q = (1, 2) are on the curve E. The line L connecting them is
L : Y = X + 1. To find the points where E and L intersect: Y = X + 1 and
Y 2 = X3 − 7X + 10. Then,
Y 2 = (X + 1)2 = X3 − 7X + 10
= X2 + 2X + 1 = X3 − 7X + 10
= X3 −X2 − 7X − 2X + 10− 1 = 0
= X3 −X2 − 9X + 9 = 0
So, X1 = −3, X2 = 3, X3 = 1. P and Q are in the intersection E ∩ L, so
X3 −X2 − 9X + 9 = (X + 3)(X − 3)(X − 1)
So, the third point (R) of intersection of L and E is X = 3. Thus,
Y = X + 1 = 1(3) + 1 = 4.
So, R = (3, 4). Finally, we reflect through the X-axis to obtain
P +Q = (3,−4) = R′. The three points P , Q and R on the elliptic curve E
are illustrated in Figure 3.3.
52
Figure 3.3: E : Y 2 = X3 − 7X + 10 with line L : Y = X + 1
3.1.1 Elliptic curve addition
Here is the formal definition.
Definition 3.1 Let A and B be integers with the discriminant
∆ = 16(4A3 − 27B2). An elliptic curve E is the set of solutions to a
Weierstrass equation
E : Y 2 = X3 + AX +B,
together with an extra point O, where the constants A and B must satisfy
∆ 6= 0.
The extra point O can be taken as the “point at infinity” in the equivalence
class representing the common point at infinity for all lines in R2 parallel to
the Y-axis.
Definition 3.2 The operation multiplication (i.e. known as scalar
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multiplication) on an elliptic curve defined by kP where k is a positive
integer and point P ∈ E(Q). This operation shows the process of adding P to
itself k times.
Definition 3.3 The point P ′ = (x,−y) is a reflection of point P = (x, y) on
X-axis and elliptic curve.
Definition 3.4 The point P ∗Q denoted as the third point of intersection of
the line through an elliptic curve and point P and Q. See the figure below.
Figure 3.4: The point P ∗Q
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Definition 3.5 The operation addition or ‘+’ on an elliptic curve is defined
by geometry and is represented by the addition sign,
+ : E(Q)× E(Q)→ E(Q).
Theorem 3.1 (Geometric Elliptic Curve Addition Algorithm) [1, Theorem
5.6, p285]
The operation + on E(Q) make the set of points with rational coordinates on
E ∪ {O} into an abelian group. Let E : Y 2 = X3 + AX +B be an elliptic
curve and let P and Q be points on E.
(a) If P = O, then P +Q = Q.
(b) Otherwise, if Q = O, then P +Q = P .
(c) Otherwise, write P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2), with x1, x2, x3, x4 ∈ Q.
(d) Define λ by
If P 6= Q and x1 6= x2 then λ = y2−y1x2−x1 , and
if P = Q then λ =
3x2
1
+A
2y1
,
and let x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2 and y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1. Then, P +Q = (x3, y3).
(e) If P ∈ E then P ′ ∈ E.
(f) If P = Q′, then O = P +Q.
(g) P ′′ = P .
Proof. (a) Let P = O, then Q+O = Q. If Q = (x2, y2), to obtain Q+O
draw a line through Q parallel to the Y-axis, then the reflection of point Q
denoted as −Q implies Q+ (−Q) = O.
(b) Similar to (a).
(c) If P 6= Q, then x1 6= x2 and y1 6= y2, where x1, x2, y1, y2 ∈ R.
(d) If x1 6= x2, then λ is the slope of the line through P and Q.
If P = Q, then λ is the slope of the tangent line at P = Q.
Either case the line L : Y = λX + c with c = y1 − λx1, where c is a constant.
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Substituting L into E gives:
(λX + c)2 = X3 + AX +B
λ2X2 + 2λXc+ c2 = X3 + AX +B
X3 − λ2X2 +X(A− 2λc) + (B − c2) = 0
So this cubic has roots x1 and x2. For the third root x3, we have the equation
X3 − λ2X2 +X(A− 2λc) + (B − c2) = (X − x1)(X − x2)(X − x3) =
X3 +X2(−x1 − x2 − x3) +X(x1x2 + x1x3)− x1x2x3.
So, −λ2X2 = X2(−x1 − x2 − x3), implies that −λ2 = −x1 − x2 − x3. Then,
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x3.
Thus, Y coordinate of the third intersection point is λx3 + c and
P1 + P2 = −λx3 − c.
(e) Let P = (x, y) on the elliptic curve E. Then, to reflect the point P across
the x-axis multiply y-coordinate (i.e. y) by −1. So we obtain a new point
−P = P ′ = (x,−y) which is also on the elliptic curve E as illustrated in
Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: The point P ∈ E implies P ′ ∈ E.
(f) Let P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) where x1 = x2 and y1 = −y2. Then
Q′ = (x2,−y2) for the curve y2 = x3 +Ax+B. If P = Q′, this means the line
through P and Q′ is vertical, so the third point of intersection is O where
x1 = x2 and y1 = −y2. Thus, P +Q = Q′ +Q = O as illustrated in Figure
3.6.
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Figure 3.6: When P = Q′ implies P +Q = O.
(g) Let P = (x1, y1). To get negative of P , we reflect the point P in the
x-axis, so P ′ = −P = (x1,−y1). Similarly, the negative of (P ′) is the
reflected point on the x-axis, so
P ′′ = −(−P ) = (x1,−(−y1)) = (x1, y1) = P .

Theorem 3.2 (Algebraic Elliptic Curve Addition Algorithm) The following
algebraic formulas for the sum of two points and double of a point are derived
from the geometric description.
(a) If P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2), then R
′ = P +Q = (x3, y3) where
x1 6= x2. This implies
x3 = (
y2−y1
x2−x1
)2 − x1 − x2 and y3 = −( y2−y1x2−x1 )x3 − (
y1x2−y2x1
x2−x1
).
(b) If P = Q, then P +Q = R′. This implies
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x3 = (
3x2
1
−A
2y1
)2 − x1 − x2 and y3 = 3x
2
1
−A
2y1
(x1 − x3)− y1.
Proof. (a) Let P = (x1, y1), Q = (x2, y2) and R
′ = P +Q = (x3, y3) where
x1 6= x2 and y1 6= y2. Here we want to find the point R′ = (x3, y3). First, we
put the line joining P and Q. The equation for this line L,
y = λx+ c where λ = y2−y1
x2−x1
and c = y1 − λx1 = y2 − λx2 is constant.
This line is intersect the curve at the points P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2).
Let the equation Y 2 = X3 + A1X
2 + A2X + A3 be a general (Weierstrass)
form. To eliminate the quadratic term, we substitute Y = y and X = x− a1
3
.
y2 = (x− A1
3
)3 + A1(x− A1
3
)2 + A2(x− A1
3
) + A3
= x3 + A2x+
2A31
27
+
A1A2
3
+ A3 − A
3
1x
3
= x3 + Ax+B.
where A = A2 − A
2
1
3
and B =
2A3
1
27
− A1A2
3
+ A3. This is a general equation of
an elliptic curve which is also known as cubic equation in x.
To obtain the third point R′ = (x3, y3), we substitute the line equation into
an elliptic curve equation above,
y2 = (λx+ c)2 = x3 + Ax+B, where A, B and c are constants.
By putting all in one side yields,
λ2x2 − 2λxc+ c2 = x3 + Ax+B
x3λ2x2 + (A− 2λc)x+ (B − c2) = 0.
Its roots are x1, x2 and x3 which leads us to give the x-coordinates of the
three intersections on the elliptic curve. Thus,
x3 + (−λ2)x2 + (A− 2λc)x+ (B − c2) = (x− x1)(x− x2)(x− x3)
= x3 − x2x3 − x2x2 + xx2x3
− x2x1 + xx1x3 − x1x2x3.
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By collecting the coefficients of the x2, we get
−λ2x2 = −x2x3 − x2x2 − x2x1
λ2 = x1 + x2 + x3.
So, the point −R = R′ = (x3, y3) is the reflection of the point R on the x-axis
(i.e. by taking the negative of the y-coordinate, see Figure 3.7), we get
x′3 = λ
2 − x1x2
x3 = (
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )− x1 − x2, and
y′3 = λx3 + c
y3 = −( y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )x3 − (y1 − λx1)
y3 = −( y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )x3 − (
y1x2 − y2x1
x2 − x1 ).
Figure 3.7: The point R′ = P +Q.
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(b) Let the two points be the same,(i.e. P = Q⇒ (x1, y1) = (x2, y2)).
Suppose that we have P 6= −P . We need to find P + P = 2P . By adding
these point together, we will get the tangent line at P where this line is
joining P to P . First, we need to find the line that joining them. Since
x1 = x2 and y1 = y2, so we cannot use the same formula for λ like above. Let
elliptic curve be E : y2 = x3 + Ax+B, where A and B are constant. If
P = Q = (x1, y1) and P 6= −Q, then the slope of the tangent line at P is
λ =
dy
dx
=
1
2
(x3 + Ax+B)−1/2(3x2 + A)
= 2yy′ = 3x2 + A
= y′ =
3x21 + A
2y1
, where y1 6= 0.
Same like proof above (i.e. in part P +Q = R′), after we collecting the
coefficients of x2, we get
λ2 = x1 + x2 + x3.
So, the point 2P = P + P = Q+Q = R′ = (x3, y3) is the reflection of the
point R on the x-axis (i.e. by taking the negative of the y-coordinate, see
Figure 3.8), we get
x′3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2
x3 = (
3x21 + A
2y1
)2 − x1 − x2, and
y′3 = λ(x3 − x1) + y1
y3 = (
3x21 + A
2y1
)(x1 − x3)− y1.

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Figure 3.8: The points P = Q implies P +Q = R′.
Note: The following properties of the group law of +.
1. + takes a point with rational coordinate to a point with rational
coordinates,
+ : E(Q)×E(Q)→ E(Q) (3.1)
Proof. Let P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) be the rational coordinates.
We apply three conditions of definition of +.
• If x1 6= x2, then third point R = (x3, y3) = P +Q is a rational
coordinate since P and Q are rational coordinates by equation
(3.1). Then reflect the point R on the x-axis to give R′ = (x3,−y3)
also with rational coordinates.
• If x1 = x2 and y1 = y2, then P +Q = 2P = 2Q = R, the third
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point, which has rational coordinates. When reflected in x-axis,
we also get a point with rational coordinates.
• Similarly, if x1 = x2 and y1 6= y2, then the third point also has
rational coordinates.

2. Write 2P instead of P + P .
Proof. When we defined the addition of two points, we can also define
a multiplication kP where k is a positive integer and P is a point as
the sum of k copies of P . Thus, 2P = P + P . 
3. For n ≥ 2, define nP as P + (n− 1)P .
Proof. For n ≥ 2. Then for all n,m ∈ Z, (n+m)P = nP +mP . Thus,
P + (n− 1)P = P + nP − P
= nP.

4. Define −P = P ′, −2P = −P + (−P ) etc.
Proof. Similar to (2). 
5. Commutativity, Q+ P = P +Q.
Proof. Let P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2). First, we solve for Q+ P .
The line that joining Q+ P = R is
L : y = λx+ c where λ = y1−y2
x1−x2
and c = y1− λx1 = y2− λx2 is constant.
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So the coordinate for the third point R = (x3, y3) as illustrated in
Figure 3.9 is
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2
= (
y1 − y2
x1 − x2 )
2 − x1 − x2
y3 = λx3 + c
= −( y1 − y2
x1 − x2 )x3 − (y1 − λx1)
= −( y1 − y2
x1 − x2 )x3 − (y1 − (
y1 − y2
x1 − x2 )x1)
= −( y1 − y2
x1 − x2 )x3 − (
y2x1 − y1x2
x1 − x2 ).
Figure 3.9: Q+ P = R.
Next, we solve for P +Q = R. The equation of the line joining P and
Q is
y = λx+ c where λ = y2−y2
x2−x1
and c = y1 − λx1 = y2 − λx2 is constant.
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The third point R = (x3, y3) as illustrated in Figure 3.10, we reflected
on x-axis which is
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2
= (
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )
2 − x1 − x2
y3 = λx3 + c
= −( y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )x3 − (y1 − λx1)
= −( y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )x3 − (y1 − (
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )x1)
= −( y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )x3 − (
y1x2 − y2x1
x2 − x1 )
Thus,
Q+ P = ((
y1 − y2
x1 − x2 )
2 − x1 − x2,−( y1 − y2
x1 − x2 )x3 − (
y2x1 − y1x2
x1 − x2 ))
= ((
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )
2 − x1 − x2,−( y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )x3 − (
y1x2 − y2x1
x2 − x1 ))
= P +Q.
Therefore, commutativity holds.

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Figure 3.10: P +Q = R.
6. Associativity, (P +Q) +R = P + (Q+R).
Proof. It is enough to show that (P +Q) ∗R = P ∗ (Q+R) where
P,Q and R are finite points on an elliptic curve E.
(a) To get P +Q, we form P ∗Q and take the third intersection of the
line connecting it to O.
(b) To add (P +Q) to R, we draw a line from R through (P +Q) and
that meets the curve at (P +Q) ∗R. To get (P +Q) +R, join the
line between point (P +Q) ∗R to O and take the third
intersection.
(c) Next, to get P ∗ (Q+R), first we need to find (Q ∗R) and then
joining them to O and take the third intersection on elliptic curve
E which is point Q+R.
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(d) To get the point P ∗ (Q+R), joining the point P to Q+R, which
leads us to get the same as (P +Q) ∗R.
Thus, the associativity holds. 
We might have nP = O and P 6= 0 for some n > 1 which leads us to describe
in the next section.
3.1.2 Torsion points
The point P is a torsion point if nP = O and P 6= 0. Each point on an
elliptic curve is based of two kinds of order:
1. a point of finite order.
2. a point of infinite order.
If P is a point of finite order, then there exists a smallest integer n such that
nP = O. If no such n exists, then P is a point of infinite order (i.e. we can
never find the point at infinity by adding P to itself).
Definition 3.6 A point P ∈ E(Q) is called a torsion point of order n if P
has order n.
E(Q)tors = {P ∈ E(Q)| there exist n ∈ N such that nP = O} ⊆ E(Q).
E(Q)tors is the set of all torsion points.
If A and B are large in the elliptic curve equation (i.e. E : y2 = x3 +Ax+B),
then there could be many such points. However, Mazur showed that the size
and structure of such a torsion subgroup is very limited. Mazur’s theorem,
created by Barry Charles Mazur in 1976, [84] describes what torsion
subgroups that are possible for an elliptic curve over Q.
67
Theorem 3.3 (Mazur’s Theorem)[80, Theorem 4.1, p11]
Let E(Q) be an elliptic curve. Then the torsion subgroup must be one of the
following 15 groups:
(i) Z/nZ, for n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12},
(ii) Z/2Z× Z/nZ, for n ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8}.
Theorem 3.3 tells us that there are no rational torsion points of order greater
than 12, (i.e. all other points are of infinite order).
The following theorem was proved by E. Lutz and T. Nagell in 1930s, [85]. It
gives an efficient method to compute the torsion subgroup of an elliptic curve
E over Q, (i.e. E(Q)tors).
Theorem 3.4 (Nagell-Lutz Theorem) [80, Theorem 5.1, p12]
Let E be an elliptic curve over Q with Weierstrass equation
E : y2 = x3 + Ax+B where A,B ∈ Z.
Then, the coordinates of a non-zero torsion point P = (x, y) ∈ E(Q) are in
Z. Furthermore, a torsion point P is either of order 2 (i.e. if y = 0) or else
y2|D where D = 4A3 + 27B2.
Example 3.2 Let an elliptic curve E : y2 = x3 + 4 and suppose that a point
P = (x, y) ∈ E(Q) has finite order. By the Nagell-Lutz theorem, we know
that either y = 0 or y2|4A3 + 27B2 = 24 · 33 = 432. Thus, the possibilities for
y occur in the following list:
0,±1,±2,±3,±4,±6,±12.
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Consider the following values of y in the rightmost column below:
0⇒ 0 = x3 + 4⇒ −4 = x3 ⇒ x /∈ Z⇒ no points with y = 0,
±1⇒ 1 = x3 + 4⇒ −3 = x3 ⇒ x /∈ Z⇒ no points with y = ±1,
±2⇒ 4 = x3 + 4⇒ 0 = x3 ⇒ x = 0 ∈ Z⇒ (0, 2) and (0,−2) ∈ E,
±3⇒ 9 = x3 + 4⇒ 5 = x3 ⇒ x /∈ Z⇒ no points with y = ±3,
±4⇒ 16 = x3 + 4⇒ 12 = x3 ⇒ x /∈ Z⇒ no points with y = ±4,
±6⇒ 36 = x3 + 4⇒ 32 = x3 ⇒ x /∈ Z⇒ no points with y = ±6,
±12⇒ 144 = x3 + 4⇒ 140 = x3 ⇒ x /∈ Z⇒ no points with y = ±12.
Trial and error shows that only y = ±2 gives x to be an integer. Hence the
only possible points here that need to be checked are (0,±2). Since
(0,−2) = −(0, 2), it is suffices to check only one of the P, P ′ points, say,
P = (0, 2). By the addition algorithm, it can be checked that
2P = P + P = (0, 2) + (0, 2) = (0,−2) = −P ,
hence 3P = 2P + P = −P + P = O.
Thus, P and −P have order 3. Therefore the torsion subgroup of E(Q) is
{O, (0, 2), (0,−2)},
which is isomorphic to the additive group Z/3Z.
3.2 Elliptic curves over finite fields
Introduction: Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is a form of public-key
cryptography where the coordinates are in a finite field, Fp. ECC was
developed by Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller in 1985, [39]. It is based on the
difficulty of solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem. The
elliptic curve equation is defined by,
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E : Y 2 = X3 + AX +B with A,B ∈ Fp, 4A3 + 27B2 6= 0, p 6= 2, 3.
In practice we use the geometric definition of + to derive formulas for the
coordinates of P +Q in the form of rational functions with integer
coefficients. These formulas make sense in any suitable field, even a finite
field (provided the characteristic p 6= 2, 3), and we use them to define + over
such a field.
Definition 3.7 Define the equation of an elliptic curve over finite field Fp as
E : Y 2 = X3 + AX +B where A,B ∈ Fp and satisfying
∆ = 16(4A3 − 27B2) 6= 0, and the group operation + is defined by the
algebraic rules of Theorem 3.2. Therefore the set E(Fp) = {(x, y) : x, y ∈ Fp
where (x, y) satisfy Y 2 = X3 + AX +B} ∪ O is an abelian group.
Example 3.3 Elliptic curve, E : Y 2 = X3 + 4X + 9 over F13, to add points
P = (10, 8) and Q = (2, 9) in E(F13), I first compute
λ = y2−y1
x2−x1
= 9−8
2−10
≡ 8 (mod 13).
Next compute
ν = y1 − λx1 = 8− 8(10) ≡ 6 (mod 13).
Finally, the addition algorithm tells us to compute
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2 = 64− 10− 2 ≡ 0 (mod 13),
y3 = −(λx3 + ν) = −(0 + 6) ≡ 2 (mod 13)
This completes the computation of
P +Q = (10, 8) + (2, 9) = (0, 2) ∈ E(F13).
Example 3.4 Let E be the elliptic curve, E : y2 = x3 + x+ 1. Compute the
number of points in the group E(Fp) when p = 5 and p = 7.
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To find the points of F5, we need to substitute all possible values
x = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and checking for which x value the quantity is
x3 + x+ 1 = a ≡ b2 (mod 5).
x = 0⇒ 0 + 0 + 1 = 1 ≡ 1 (mod 5) = 12, 42.
x = 1⇒ 13 + 1 + 1 = 3 ≡ 3 (mod 5).
x = 2⇒ 23 + 2 + 1 = 11 ≡ 1 (mod 5) = 12, 42.
x = 3⇒ 33 + 3 + 1 = 31 ≡ 1 (mod 5) = 12, 42.
x = 4⇒ 43 + 4 + 1 = 69 ≡ 4 (mod 5).
Thus, E(F5) = {O, (0, 1), (0, 4), (2, 1), (2, 4), (3, 1), (3, 4)} so has 7 elements.
For E(F7), the values of x are 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
x = 0⇒ 0 + 0 + 1 = 1 ≡ 1 (mod 7) = 12, 62.
x = 1⇒ 13 + 1 + 1 = 3 ≡ 3 (mod 7).
x = 2⇒ 23 + 2 + 1 = 11 ≡ 4 (mod 7) = 12, 52.
x = 3⇒ 33 + 3 + 1 = 31 ≡ 3 (mod 7).
x = 4⇒ 43 + 4 + 1 = 69 ≡ 6 (mod 7).
x = 5⇒ 53 + 5 + 1 = 131 ≡ 5 (mod 7).
x = 6⇒ 63 + 6 + 1 = 223 ≡ 6 (mod 7).
Thus, E(F7) = {O, (0, 1), (0, 6), (2, 1), (2, 5)} so has 5 elements.
3.3 The elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem (ECDLP)
Introduction: The ECDLP is a variation of the discrete logarithm problem.
The ECDLP is defined over the points of an elliptic curve. The security of
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elliptic curve cryptography depends on ECDLP, which is the discrete
logarithm problem applied to elliptic curves, [8].
Definition 3.8 Let E be an elliptic curve over the finite field Fp and let P
and Q be points in E(Fp). The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
(ECDLP) is the problem of finding an integer n such that Q = nP . By
analogy with the discrete logarithm problem for F∗p, we denoted this integer n
by
n = logP (Q)
and we call n the elliptic discrete logarithm of Q with respect to P.
Example 3.5 Let E be the elliptic curve, E : y2 = x3 + x+ 1 and let
P = (4, 2) and Q = (0, 1) be points on E modulo 5. I solve the elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem for P and Q, by finding a positive integer n such
that Q = nP .
Solution:
First, we need to find 2P = P + P :
λ = 3(x(P ))
2+A
2y(P )
= 49
4
= 1,
where x(P ) and y(P ) are values of x and y respectively of the point P . By
using the addition algorithm (refer to Theorem 3.1),
x(2P ) = λ2 − 2x(P ) = 12 − 2(4) = 3.
y(2P ) = λ(x(P )− x(2P ))− y(P ) = 1(4− 3)− 2 = 4
Thus, 2P = (3, 4).
Next, find 3P = 2P + P .
λ = y(2P )−y(P )
x(2P )−x(P )
= 4−2
3−4
= 3.
In a similar manner, we apply the addition algorithm to get the next
coordinate:
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x(3P ) = λ2 − x(2P )− x(P ) = 32 − 3− 4 = 2.
y(4P ) = λ(x(P )− x(3P ))− y(P ) = 3(4− 2)− 2 = 4.
Thus, 3P = (2, 4).
By using the same steps as above, we continue to calculate coordinates until
we find the integer n.
4P = (0, 4)
5P = (0, 1) = Q.
Therefore, the integer n is 5.
3.4 Application of elliptic curves to
cryptography
Introduction: This explains how elliptic curves are applied to
cryptography. We consider two applications, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
and the El-Gamal public key cryptosystem.
3.4.1 Elliptic Diffie-Hellman key exchange
(a) Public parameter creation
Alice and Bob choose and publish a large prime p, an elliptic curve E over Fp
and a point P ∈ E(Fp).
(b) Private computations
Alice: chooses a secret integer nA. Then, computes the point on the curve
QA = nAP .
Bob : chooses a secret integer nB. Then, computes the point on the curve
QB = nBP .
(c) Public exchange of values
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Then, they exchange the values of QA and QB. In other words, Alice sends
QA to Bob and Bob sends QB to Alice.
(d) Further private computations
Alice then uses her secret multiplier to compute the point nAQB. While Bob
computes the corresponding, nBQA. So now, they are able to share the secret
value which is
nAQB = (nAnB)P = nBQA.
They can then use this value as a key to communicate privately.
Example 3.6 Alice and Bob decide to use elliptic Diffie-Hellman key
exchange with the following prime, curve and point.
p = 3889, E : Y 2 = X3 + 354X + 1234, P = (921, 304) ∈ E(F3889).
Alice and Bob choose respective secret values nA = 123 and nB = 456 and
then
Alice computes QA = 123P = 2
6P + 25P + 24P + 23P + 2P + P ∈ E(F3889)
= 64P + 32P + 16P + 8P + 2P + P ∈ E(F3889)
= (1717, 3600) + (219, 3579) + (361, 1165) + (2043, 2691)
+ (2270, 3888) + (921, 304) ∈ E(F3889)
= (721, 2157) ∈ E(F3889).
Bob computes QB = 456P = 2
8P + 27P + 26P + 23P ∈ E(F3889)
= 256P + 128P + 64P + 8P ∈ E(F3889)
= (1229, 2109) + (2132, 837) + (1717, 3600)
+ (2043, 2691) ∈ E(F3889)
= (1383, 936) ∈ E(F3889).
Bob and Alice have exchanged the secret point
nAQB = 123(1383, 936) = 456(721, 2157) = nBQA = (3160, 722).
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3.4.2 Elliptic El-Gamal public key cryptosystem
The direct analogue of the classical El-Gamal public key cryptosystem.
(a) Public parameter creation
A trusted people choose and publish a large prime p, an elliptic curve over Fp
and a point P in E(Fp).
(b) Key creation
Alice chooses a private key nA and publishes the point QA = nAP as a public
key.
(c) Encryption
Bob chooses plaintext encoded as M ∈ E(Fp) and chooses an integer k as a
temporary key. By using Alice’s public key QA, Bob computes
c1 = kP ∈ E(Fp) and c2 =M + kQA ∈ E(Fp).
Then he sends the two points (c1, c2) to Alice.
(d) Decryption
Alice computes
c2 − nAc1 = (M + kQA)− nA(kP )
= M + k(nAP )− nA(kP )
= M ∈ E(Fp),which is the plaintext.
3.5 Applications of elliptic curve
cryptography
Introduction: Elliptic curve cryptography is becoming more popular
because of the small number of bits required to generate keys compared to
other cryptosystems. Thus, it has been used frequently. Here are some
examples of elliptic curve cryptography where it has been applied.
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1. Wireless security / communication
• Wireless devices have become prevalent for communication.
Basically, these devices need less memory and low computational
power but require a high level of security, [77, 6].
• When wireless messages are sent or shared, we need to be sure
that our communications are secure and the message remains
secret. So, elliptic curve cryptography is one way to solve security
problems. Since the key size of elliptic curve cryptography is
relatively small, the encrypted/decrypted message and
computational power are small, [78, 79].
• Applying elliptic curve cryptography to wireless communication is
very efficient for large data files and encrypted files. Also, elliptic
curve cryptography involves low data rate transmissions and low
power requirements, [7].
2. Smart cards
• Smart cards such as those used for telephone calling, electronic
cash payments, health care, identification and other applications is
a plastic card with a built in microchip that can be loaded with
data/information. The advantage of a smart card is it can store
sensitive data that can be protected from unauthorized access.
• Elliptic curve cryptography is compatible for smart card because,
[5, p10].
(a) it requires less memory and shorter transmission times
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- Since the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
algorithm uses small keys, it requires a small amount of
memory to store those keys and to transfer data.
(b) Scalability for system resources
- A smart card would need a strong security and large
storage to keep long keys, but in contrast by using elliptic
curve cryptography which has small keys, this problem
can be solved resulting in low-cost of production and a
higher level of security.
(c) No coprocessor required
- When using elliptic curve cryptography for a smart card,
there is no additional hardware required in the CPU
(central processing unit) because elliptic curve
cryptography reduces processing times.
(d) On card key generation
- The private key on a smart card must be kept secret from
unauthorized users to ensure security. Basically, a key is
embedded into a card to be ensure it is personalized and
authenticated.
- Provided a good random number generator is available
with elliptic curve cryptography, the time required to
generate the private key is short and generation only
requires low computing power that is typically available
on of a smart card. This means that the card
personalization process can be more efficient for
applications in which nonrepudiation is important.
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3. Network security/securing the web
• Since the keys of elliptic curve cryptography are small, the effect
of its application is faster computations, lower power consumption
and memory and bandwidth savings, [10].
Chapter 4
Encryption and decryption
using the RSA cryptosystem
and elliptic curve cryptography
Introduction: In cryptography, there are many ways to send or receive
messages. In this chapter we give some examples using RSA cryptosystems
and elliptic curve cryptography to encrypt and decrypt messages.
4.1 The RSA cryptosystem
Question 1:
Alice publishes her RSA public key: modulus N = 1351500281 and exponent
e = 5441.
(a) Bob wants to send Alice the message m = 234698. What ciphertext does
Bob send to Alice?
Solution:
The public key is (N, e) = (1351500281, 5441). By the way,
p · q = N = 1351500281. We know that the ciphertext, c ≡ me (mod N). So,
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by using software we get c ≡ 2346985441 ≡ 107925960 (mod 1351500281).
Thus, the ciphertext is 107925960.
(b) Alice knows that her modulus factors into a product of two primes, one
of which is p = 124459. Find the decryption exponent d for Alice.
Solution:
We have p · q = N = 1351500281. Then 124459 · q = 1351500281. So
q = 10859.
e · d ≡ 1 (mod (p− 1)(q − 1)).
(p− 1) · (q − 1) = (124458)(10858) = 1351364964.
5441 · d ≡ 1 (mod 1351364964).
By using extended Euclidean algorithm of software, we have d = 23098133.
(c) Alice receives the ciphertext c = 107925960 from Bob and decrypt the
message.
Solution:
cd (mod N) ≡ 10792596023098133 (mod 1351500281).
≡ 234698 (mod 1351500281).
So, the message is 234698.
Question 2:
Bob’s RSA public key has modulus N = 555722767441851267329933783 and
exponent e = 738083. Alice sends Bob the ciphertext
c = 127053668429207502906717463. Unfortunately, Bob has chosen too small
a modulus. Help Eve by factoring N and decrypting Alice’s message.
Solution:
Given that N = 555722767441851267329933783 = p · q. Then, we can
factorize N :
555722767441851267329933783 = 23579273408279 · 23568273619777.
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We must check that
gcd(e, (p− 1)(q − 1)) = gcd(738083, 555722767441804119782905728) = 1. So,
c ≡ 127053668429207502906717463 (mod 555722767441851267329933783).
Bob knows (p− 1) · (q − 1) = 23579273408278 · 23568273619776 =
555722767441804119782905728.
e · d ≡ 1 (mod (p− 1)(q − 1))
738083 · d ≡ 1 (mod 555722767441804119782905728).
So, d = 174664052133905969528140427.
Then,
cd (mod N) ≡ 127053668429207502906717463174664052133905969528140427 (mod N)
≡ 234580277294629 (mod 555722767441851267329933783).
So, the message is m = 234580277294629.
Question 3:
(a) Use Alice’s RSA public encryption key
(N, e) = (931193664662420801428126247840126135129, 6283649) to encrypt
the word ’SEE YOU LATER’.
(First change the letters to numbers using
space = 00, a = 01, b = 02, c = 03, ...).
Solution:
By using software, we factorize N to get p = 23459512369369265081 and
q = 39693649637759157409 where N = p · q. Then choose e = 6283649.
φ(n) = (p− 1) · (q − 1) = 23459512369369265080 · 39693649637759157408 =
931193664662420801364973085832997712640. The encryption key is
(N, e) = (931193664662420801428126247840126135129, 6283649). We need to
change the word ’SEE YOU LATER’ to numbers: SEE YOU LATER =
19050500251521001201200518. To encrypt the message, we must use the
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encryption key (N, e).
c ≡ me (mod N)
≡ 190505002515210012012005186283649 (mod N)
≡ 52648878878742875284154191732044442509
(mod 931193664662420801428126247840126135129).
So, the encoded message is ’YJGXFFOFYCONJSTQQYI’.
(b) Bob encrypted a word with Alice’s encryption key
(N, e) = (931193664662420801428126247840126135129, 6283649). He obtains
the number 52648878878742875284154191732044442509. Use Alice’s
decryption key d = 501469130233221884785435566252401557889 to decrypt
this number and get back Bob’s message.
Solution:
m ≡ cd (mod N)
≡ 52648878878742875284154191732044442509501469130233221884785435566252401557889 (mod N)
≡ 19050500251521001201200518 (mod 931193664662420801428126247840126135129).
So the message is ’SEE YOU LATER’.
4.2 Elliptic curve cryptography
Question 1:
Alice and Bob agree to use elliptic Diffie-Hellman key exchange with the
prime, elliptic curve and point p = 2671, E : Y 2 = X3 + 171X + 853,
P = (1980, 431) ∈ E(F2671).
(a) Alice sends Bob the point QA = (2110, 543). Bob decides to use the secret
multiplier nB = 1943. What point should Bob send to Alice?
Solution:
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To answer this question, we used Mathematica software to make the job
easier.
1943 = 210 + 29 + 28 + 27 + 24 + 22 + 21 + 20. Then, Bob needs to compute
QB to send to Alice.
QB = nBP = 1943(1980, 431).
P = (1980, 431), 9P = (1124, 363)
2P = (1950, 1697), 10P = (2431, 1318)
3P = (415, 301), 11P = (1858, 644)
4P = (1894, 1829), 12P = (1490, 1078)
5P = (45, 166), 13P = (143, 27)
6P = (536, 312), 14P = (289, 578)
7P = (2288, 2333), 15P = (763, 9)
8P = (1160, 1268), 16P = (1116, 2037)
1943P = 210P + 29P + 28P + 27P + 24P + 22P + 21P + 20P
1943P = (175, 1556)+ (970, 2139)+ (2142, 864)+ (2006, 430)+ (1116, 2037)+
(1894, 1829) + (1950, 1697) + (1980, 431). So, Bob sends point QB to Alice,
QB = 1943P = (2580, 1400).
(b) What is their secret shared value?
Solution:
Alice sends to Bob, QA = (2110, 543). Bob sends to Alice,
QB = (2580, 1400). So, Bob computes nBQA = 1943(2110, 543).
Use the same method as above to get their shared value nBQA = (656, 1205).
Question 2:
The cryptosystem parameter are E11(1, 6) and G = (2, 7). Bob’s secret key in
nB = 7.
(a) Find Bob’s public key PB.
Solution:
We know that PB = nBG = 7(2, 7). By using software, we get
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G = (2, 7)
2G = (5, 2)
3G = (8, 3)
4G = (10, 2)
5G = (3, 6)
6G = (7, 9)
7G = (7, 2)
So, the value of PB is (7, 2).
(b) Alice wishes to encrypt the message Pm = (10, 9) and chooses the random
value k = 3. Determine the ciphertext Cm.
Solution:
Bob’s public key is PB = (7, 2). We have,
3(2, 7) = (8, 3), and
(10, 9) + 3(7, 2) = (10, 9) + (3, 5).
To find addition point (10, 9) + (3, 5), λ = y2−y1
x2−x1
= 5−10
3−9
= 10.
ν = y1 − λx1 = 9− 10(10) = 3.
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2 = 102 − 10− 3 = 10.
y3 = −(λx3 + ν) = −(10(10) + 3) = 7.
So, (10,9) + 3(7,2) = (10,7). Thus, Alice sends the ciphertext (8, 3), (10, 7).
Question 3:
Let E be the elliptic curve E : Y 2 = X3 + 1541x+ 1335 and let
P = (2898, 439). The prime p = 3221 and n = 3211. By using the elliptic
curve addition algorithm, compute nP in E(Fp).
Solution:
The binary expansion of n is
n = 3211 = 211 + 210 + 27 + 23 + 21 + 20.
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Then we can compute
3211P = 211P + 210P + 27P + 23P + 2P + P
= 2048P + 1024P + 128P + 8P + 2P + P.
First we need to find all the values that are related to get 3211P .
P = (2898, 439)
2P = (1951, 1370)
3P = (2438, 608)
8P = (2937, 310)
128P = (2475, 2561)
1024P = (1596, 2944)
2048P = (1566, 2267)
Then, we combine all together yields
3211P = = 2048P + 1024P + 128P + 8P + 2P + P
= (1566, 2267) + (1596, 2944) + (2475, 2561) + (2937, 310)
+ (1951, 1370) + (2898, 439)
= (1388, 1990).
Thus, nP = 3211P = (1388, 1990).
Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this thesis, I studied the mathematics of the two public-key
cryptosystems, the RSA cryptosystem and elliptic curve cryptography. These
are the most well-known cryptosystems used currently throughout the world.
The RSA cryptosystem is based on elementary number theory. However,
RSA can be broken, in two cases; either a brilliant mathematician knows how
to factor large integers very quickly or this factoring can be performed by
high speed computers. Therefore, mathematicians and scientists have
designed new approaches to message encryption like elliptic curve
cryptography.
Elliptic curve cryptography is another cryptosystem that is very efficient and
is frequently used nowadays. I explained how elliptic curves can be used to
create public key systems for encryption and decryption. Since there is an
infinite set of elliptic curves, it makes it difficult for an adversary or
eavesdropper to decrypt a communication. In addition, elliptic curve
cryptosystems are efficient because they use smaller key sizes, have low
computational power requirements and give better performance than RSA
cryptosystem.
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